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Constitutionalizing Corruption: Citizens
United, Its Conceptions of Political
Corruption, and the Implications for
Judicial Elections Campaigns
By OFER RABAN*

Introduction

C

ITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION invalidated
a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) that
prohibited corporations and unions from spending money on “electioneering communication.”1 The decision—which was written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, a former lobbyist2—was based on an
exceedingly narrow definition of political corruption.3 This Article argues that the Court’s definition flies in the face of federal bribery laws,
and that it fails to draw a meaningful distinction between corrupt and
permissible political action. The Court’s poor reasoning is all the
more unfortunate since, as this Article also explains, the Citizens United
decision appears to be applicable to judicial elections as well.
* Ofer Raban, Associate Professor of Law and Elmer Sahlstrom Senior Fellow,
University of Oregon. I would like to extend special thanks to Lee Goldman, Jim Mooney,
and Helen Norton for their helpful comments. Many thanks also go to my diligent
research assistant, Dane Henager.
1. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-1, 441i, 441k, and 36
U.S.C. § 510 (2006). “Electioneering communications” is defined by the statute as “any
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” with a potential reach of 50,000 people or
more that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office, in the thirty days prior
to an election. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2006).
2. See Ill. Inst. of Tech. Chi.-Kent Coll. of Law, Anthony M. Kennedy: Biography, OYEZ,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/anthony_kennedy (last visited January 10, 2012). Kennedy’s
father was a lobbyist, and Kennedy continued his father’s work when he took over his
father’s practice. See id.
3. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010) (“When Buckley identified a
sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance
of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”).
359
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Citizens United has been widely discussed and subjected to exhaustive criticism.4 My discussion, by contrast, would not offer a comprehensive analysis of the case; instead, I will focus on the specific issue of
political corruption—which was of vital importance to the decision,
and remains vital to the future of campaign finance regulations. The
Article progresses as follows: Part I.A. analyzes the debate between the
majority and the partial dissent (hereafter “dissent”) over the proper
definition of political corruption.5 Part I.B. examines the definition of
political corruption appearing in the federal bribery statute, and then
re-examines the majority’s understanding of corruption in light of
that definition. Part II explains why the Court is likely to regard the
Citizens United decision as governing judicial elections. And the final
Part is a short and gloomy conclusion that connects Citizens United to
other Roberts Court campaign finance decisions, and explains the
Court’s regrettable conception of the proper relation between money
and election campaigns

I.

Political Corruption

This section is divided into two parts: the first examines the debate between the majority and the dissent over the proper definition
of political corruption; the second evaluates the majority’s definition
in light of federal bribery laws, and the need to draw a meaningful
line between bribery and legitimate financial support.

4. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 673 (2011); Richard
L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989
(2011); Robert L. Kerr, Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating Lochner’s Error in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 311 (2010); Matthew A.
Melone, Citizens United and Corporate Political Speech: Did the Supreme Court Enhance Political
Discourse or Invite Corruption?, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 29 (2010); Gene Nichol, Citizens United
and the Roberts Court’s War on Democracy, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1007 (2011); Anne Tucker,
Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens
United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497 (2010); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good
Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365 (2010); Ronald
Dworkin, The Decision That Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 13, 2010), http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/decision-threatens-democracy/; Laurence H. Tribe, What Should Congress Do About Citizens United?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 24,
2010, 10:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/what-should-congress-do-about-citizens-united/.
5. The four justices who dissented from the invalidation of the BCRA’s ban on corporate and union electioneering communication concurred in the Court’s upholding of
the BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure provisions. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913–16.
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A. Defining Political Corruption
The Citizens United decision quickly dismissed two of the government’s alleged interests in banning corporate and union electioneering communications. First, the Court rejected the anti-distortion,
or equalizing, rationale—that is, the government’s interest in equalizing the ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcomes of
elections.6 That interest was endorsed by the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce;7 but Citizens United overruled Austin and declared the anti-distortion rationale inconsistent with precedent and
with established First Amendment principles.8 Second, the Court rejected the government’s interest in protecting shareholders from having company funds expended on political campaigns against their
will.9 The challenged provision, said the Court, was both underinclusive and overinclusive in regard to that interest: underinclusive because it forbade corporate expenditures only during certain time
periods but not otherwise; overinclusive in that it also applied to single shareholder corporations.10
What remained was the government interest in the prevention of
corruption and the appearance of corruption—an interest recognized
as “sufficiently important” to justify campaign finance restrictions
since Buckley v. Valeo, the seminal case on the subject.11 However, Citizens United was a campaign expenditures case; and Buckley famously drew
a distinction between campaign contributions and expenditures, and
dismissed the anti-corruption interest in regard to the latter.12 The
opinion explained the distinction as follows:
Unlike contributions, . . . independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may
prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not
only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate,
6. Id. at 904.
7. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
8. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904, 913.
9. Id. at 911.
10. Id.
11. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1976).
12. Indeed, Buckley is understood to require a stricter level of constitutional scrutiny
for limitations on expenditures than for limitations on contributions. See, e.g., FEC v. Mass.
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259–60 (1986) (“We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending.”). Under Buckley, expenditures coordinated with candidates’ campaigns are
treated as contributions. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 (“[S]uch controlled or coordinated
expenditures are treated as contributions rather than expenditures . . . .”).
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but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.13

These dubious propositions have been subjected to endless criticism,
both from within and from without the Court.14 The idea that the
spirited efforts of well-financed, well-informed, and well-advised organizations are often “counterproductive,” or that they go unappreciated by the candidates they support, seems implausible.15 Such
organizations employ campaign strategists who are no less savvy then
those working for the candidates themselves,16 and their efforts often
13. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. Buckley treated expenditures coordinated with candidates’
campaigns as contributions for purposes of constitutional analysis. Id. at 46–47.
14. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 119–20
(2010) (“Academic commentary has long had a field day with the core expenditures-versuscontributions rationale of Buckley. The system of limited contributions but unchecked expenditures runs afoul of the animating logic of the 1974 campaign finance amendments,
and is in fact a regulatory structure created by the Court. No rational regulatory system
would seek to limit the manner by which money is supplied to political campaigns, then
leave unchecked the demand for that same money by leaving spending uncapped. In the
meantime, majorities drawn from varying voting blocs on the Court have persistently rejected the Buckley divide between contributions and expenditures, with only a division
among the Justices on how to overturn Buckley serving to shore up a frayed body of law.”
(footnotes omitted)); J. Robert Abraham, Note, Saving Buckley: Creating a Stable Campaign
Finance Framework, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1078, 1091–92 (2010) (tallying half the Justices that
have served since 1976 as opposed to the Buckley framework); see also FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 510–11 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (“The
distinction is not tenable. . . . [T]he reasons underlying limits on contributions equally
underly [sic] limits on such ‘independent’ expenditures. The credulous acceptance of the
formal distinction between coordinated and independent expenditures blinks political reality. That the PACs’ expenditures are not formally ‘coordinated’ is too slender a reed on
which to distinguish them from actual contributions to the campaign. The candidate cannot help but know of the extensive efforts ‘independently’ undertaken on his behalf. In
this realm of possible tacit understandings and implied agreements, I see no reason not to
accept the congressional judgment that so-called independent expenditures must be
closely regulated.”); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 266–67 (2006) (Thomas, J., joined by
Scalia, J., concurring) (“‘I believe that contribution limits infringe as directly and as seriously upon freedom of political expression and association as do expenditure limits.’ . . . I
would overrule Buckley and subject both . . . to strict scrutiny, which they would fail.” (quoting Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 640 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part))); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 750–51 (2008)
(Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Justice White—who maintained his steadfast opposition to Buckley’s view of
expenditure limits—was correct.” (citation omitted)).
15. Organizations engaged in independent expenditures may be classified as “political committees” so that their budgets may be subjected to statutory contribution limits.
The constitutionality of these limitations has been challenged, and lower courts are divided over the issue. One principal question is whether such restrictions should be analyzed as limitation on expenditures or as limitations on contributions. See generally
Abraham, supra note 14.
16. For example, Karl Rove, the architect of George W. Bush’s election campaigns, is
one of the founders of American Crossroads, an organization that has raised and spent
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complement candidates’ campaigns even without any formal coordination—especially in their use of negative ads, which are said to be
more effective when originating from independent sources rather
than the candidate.17 Moreover, candidates are well aware of such efforts and appreciate them.18
There may be better justifications for the Court’s expenditures/
contributions distinction. For one thing, campaign contributions—
where control over money is transferred directly to the beneficiary—
constitute an added risk of corruption by that fact alone. Additionally,
as the Buckley opinion also noted, while restrictions on expenditures
“necessarily reduce[ ] the quantity of expression,” restrictions on contributions “involve[ ] little direct restraint on . . . political communication” because they still allow the frustrated contributor to spend
money in support of her candidate.19 And although this has no bearing on whether expenditures pose a lesser danger of corruption than
contributions, it does mean that restricting expenditures may constitute a heavier burden on First Amendment freedom.
However, given that the expenditures/contributions distinction
has been subjected to persistent criticism from both sides of the ideological aisle,20 and given its particular weakness in the context of corporations and unions (which possess vast coffers and narrow, easily
identified interests), it was not surprising that the Citizens United opintens of millions of dollars in independent expenditures to defend and elect conservative
candidates to federal office. See Jim Rutenberg, Rove Returns, With Team, Planning G.O.P.
Push, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010 at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/us/26rove.html?
pagewanted=all.
17. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 623 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003),
overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). See also text accompanying note
33.
18. See, e.g., id. (“The record . . . indicates that Members [of Congress] express appreciation to organizations for the airing of . . . election-related advertisements. Indeed, Members of Congress are particularly grateful when negative issue advertisements are run by
these organizations, leaving the candidates free to run positive advertisements and be seen
as ‘above the fray.’ Political consultants testify that campaigns are quite aware of who is
running advertisements on the candidate’s behalf, when they are being run, and where
they are being run. Likewise, a prominent lobbyist testifies that these organizations use
issue advocacy as a means to influence various Members of Congress.” (citations omitted));
see also SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 567 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting the participation
of leading elected officials, including former President Bill Clinton, in the events of independent expenditure committees).
19. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 21–22 (1976).
20. The distinction has been criticized both by those who seek to extend the constitutionality of restrictions on contributions to expenditures and by those who seek to extend
the unconstitutionality of restrictions on expenditures to contributions. See, e.g., Abraham,
supra note 14, at 1091–92.
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ion sought to bolster and supplement that distinction when rejecting
the government’s anti-corruption interest. It did so by offering an exceedingly narrow conception of what political corruption is.
According to the opinion, the anti-corruption interest was strictly
limited to fighting explicit quid pro quo exchanges where campaign
spending is made in exchange for a specific political favor: “When
Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption,” said the
Court, “that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”21 In fact,
added the opinion, “[t]he practices Buckley noted” in approving the
anti-corruption interest “would be covered by bribery laws, see, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 201, if a quid pro quo arrangement were proved.”22
In other words, the anti-corruption interest was limited to combating the sort of quid pro quo arrangements made criminal by federal
bribery laws.23 And this narrow view of political corruption meant that
there was little relevant evidence of corruption before the Court: the
record supporting the BCRA, said the Court, “was ‘over 100,000
pages’ long,”24 “yet it ‘does not have any direct examples of votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures.’”25
21. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).
22. Id. at 908. The “practices Buckley noted” included a $2 million campaign pledge by
the dairy industry to President Nixon, who in turn overruled a decision of his Secretary of
Agriculture and increased price support for dairy products. After that decision was made,
but before it became public, Nixon’s people contacted industry representatives to inform
of the decision and seek a reaffirmation of the pledge. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821,
839 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and modified, 532
F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1976). That, indeed, was a paradigmatic example of an explicit quid pro
quo, though Buckley did not seem to limit the anti-corruption interest to such quid pro quos.
Buckley referenced the episode indirectly by simply referring to the Court of Appeals’ discussion of it, and the Court of Appeals, in turn, explicitly stated that “[i]t is not material,
for present purposes . . . whether the President’s decision was . . . conditioned upon or
‘linked’ to the reaffirmation of the pledge.” Id. Linked or not, said the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals, the episode demonstrated the government’s “clear and compelling interest in
safeguarding the integrity of elections and avoiding the undue influence of wealth.” Id. at
841. Buckley similarly stated that “laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal
with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27–28.
23. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909–10.
24. Id. at 910 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 209 (D.D.C. 2003)
(per curiam), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct. 876.
25. Id. (omission in original) (quoting, McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 560 (KollarKotelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The fact that the record was devoid
of such instances of corruption, added the opinion, “confirms Buckley’s reasoning that independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.” Id. But of course, this narrow conception of corruption would make it equally
difficult to find evidence of corruption in campaign contributions as well.
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And yet, as the dissent pointed out, “It would have been quite
remarkable if Congress had created a record detailing such behavior
by its own Members.”26 Remarkable indeed, given that “such behavior” is a federal felony punishable by fifteen years of imprisonment.27
Moreover, as the dissent also observed, “[p]roving that a specific vote
was exchanged for a specific expenditure has always been next to impossible: Elected officials have diverse motivations, and no one will
acknowledge that he sold a vote.”28 In short, it was only to be expected
that the record would have no examples of such explicit exchanges,
and it was therefore unjustified to limit government action only to
containing such instances:
[W]e have never suggested that such quid pro quo debts must take
the form of outright vote buying or bribes, which have long been
distinct crimes. Rather, they encompass the myriad ways in which
outside parties may induce an officeholder to confer a legislative
benefit in direct response to, or anticipation of, some outlay of
money the parties have made or will make on behalf of the
officeholder.29

In other words, instances that did not violate bribery laws could still
constitute the sort of corruption that the government could seek to
prevent. Bribery was the most extreme but not the most dangerous
form of corruption that campaign finance regulations could prohibit:
“There are threats of corruption that are far more destructive to a
democratic society than the odd bribe.”30 And one of those was defined by the notion of “undue influence”:
On numerous occasions we have recognized Congress’ legitimate
interest in preventing the money that is spent on elections from
exerting an “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment” and
from creating “‘the appearance of such influence’” . . . .31

This form of political corruption was rampant and well documented:
“[T]he record Congress developed in passing BCRA . . .” read the
dissent, stands as a remarkable testament to the energy and ingenuity
with which corporations, unions, lobbyists, and politicians may go
about scratching each other’s backs . . . .”32 The district court that
26.
part).
27.
28.
part).
29.
United,
30.
31.
32.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 965 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(4) (2006).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 965 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
Id. at 964 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 90, 143 (2003), overruled by Citizens
130 S. Ct. 876).
Id. at 962.
Id. at 961 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150).
Id.
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adjudicated the initial challenge to the BCRA described that record as
follows:
[C]orporations and labor unions routinely notify Members of Congress as soon as they air electioneering communications relevant to
the Members’ elections. The record also indicates that Members
express appreciation to organizations for the airing of these election-related advertisements. Indeed, Members of Congress are particularly grateful when negative issue advertisements are run by
these organizations, leaving the candidates free to run positive advertisements and be seen as “above the fray.” Political consultants
testify that campaigns are quite aware of who is running advertisements on the candidate’s behalf, when they are being run, and
where they are being run. Likewise, a prominent lobbyist testifies
that these organizations use issue advocacy as a means to influence
various Members of Congress.
. . . After the election, these organizations often seek credit
for their support. . . . [A] large majority of Americans (80%) are of
the view that corporations and other organizations that engage in
electioneering communications, which benefit specific elected officials, receive special consideration from those officials when matters arise that affect these corporations and organizations.33

The dissent therefore opted for a broader conception of political corruption based on the idea of “undue influence”:
Our “undue influence” cases have allowed the American people to . . . ensure, to some minimal extent, “that officeholders will
decide issues . . . on the merits or the desires of their constituencies,” and not “according to the wishes of those who have made
large financial contributions”—or expenditures—“valued by the
officeholder.” When private interests are seen to exert outsized
control over officeholders solely on account of the money spent on
(or withheld from) their campaigns, the result can depart so thoroughly “from what is pure or correct” in the conduct of Government, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 512 (1966)
(defining “corruption”), that it amounts to a “subversion . . . of the
electoral process”. . . .34

For a former lobbyist, this definition of corruption may have
struck too close to home. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion would
have none of it:
The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected
officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt:
33. Id. at 961–62 (second alteration in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.
Supp. 2d 176, 623–24 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
876).
34. Id. at 962 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting McConnell,
540 U.S. at 153, overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, and United States v. UAW, 352
U.S. 567, 575 (1957)).
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Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics . . . . It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a
vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate
over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors.
Democracy is premised on responsiveness.35

The democratic process consists of individuals and groups vying to
influence elected representatives, and those attempts—claimed the
majority—may legitimately take the form of spending money on candidates’ campaigns.36 And since it is perfectly legitimate for individuals or entities to provide financial support to a candidate with the
expectation “that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors,”37 it is presumably equally legitimate for the candidate, once elected, to produce the expected
responsiveness.38
The majority recognized, of course, that elected officials may act
inappropriately in the face of such influence; but such deplorable actions, it said, did not necessarily amount to political corruption:
If elected officials succumb to improper influences from independent expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if
they put expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for
concern. We must give weight to attempts by Congress to seek to
dispel either the appearance or the reality of these influences. The
remedies enacted by law, however, must comply with the First
Amendment . . . . Here Congress has created categorical bans on
speech that are asymmetrical to preventing quid pro quo
corruption.39
35. Id. at 910 (majority opinion) (first alteration in original) (quoting McConnell, 540
U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
38. This was not the first time the Supreme Court advanced such a view. See FEC v.
Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) (“The fact that candidates and elected officials may alter . . . their own positions on issues in response to political messages paid for by the PACs can hardly be called corruption, for one of the essential
features of democracy is the presentation to the electorate of varying points of view. It is of
course hypothetically possible here, as in the case of the independent expenditures forbidden in Buckley, that candidates may take notice of and reward those responsible for PAC
expenditures by giving official favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting messages.
But here, as in Buckley, the absence of prearrangement and coordination undermines the
value of the expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate. On this
record, such an exchange of political favors for uncoordinated expenditures remains a
hypothetical possibility and nothing more.”).
39. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910–11 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176,
555–57 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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In short, political supporters may legitimately seek to win influence
over elected officials through campaign contributions and expenditures, and elected officials may legitimately be responsive to these
forms of support.40 And while these responses may not assume the
form of a quid pro quo exchange, if officials merely “succumb to improper influences from independent expenditures [or] surrender
their best judgment [or] put expediency before principle” their conduct is not the sort of political corruption belonging to the anti-corruption rationale.41
All this sounded like so much hairsplitting. But the Court sought
to support this conception of political corruption by relying on federal bribery laws, stating, as we saw, that corruption was limited to the
practices “covered by bribery laws, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201, if a quid
pro quo arrangement were proved.”42 However, as we shall now see, the
conception of political corruption reflected in that federal statute
goes well beyond the Citizens United understanding of that concept.
B. Federal Bribery Laws and the Majority’s Definition of Political
Corruption
18 U.S.C. § 201 divides into two main parts: one criminalizing
“bribery” and the other criminalizing “gratuity.”43 Committing gratuity does not require a quid pro quo (a requirement similarly omitted
from many state bribery laws).44 The statute’s conception of political
corruption is therefore, by that fact alone, broader than the Court’s.45
40. Id. at 910 (“[A] substantial and legitimate reason . . . to make a contribution to,
one candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those political
outcomes the supporter favors.”).
41. Id. at 908–09, 911.
42. Id. at 908 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839–40 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
43. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (“Whoever . . . directly or indirectly, corruptly
gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official or person who has been
selected to be a public official, or offers or promises any public official or any person who
has been selected to be a public official to give anything of value to any other person or
entity, with intent . . . to influence any official act” (defining bribery)), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(c) (“Whoever . . . directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to
any public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or
because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official, former
public official, or person selected to be a public official” (defining gratuity)). Both sections
contain equivalent provisions punishing the recipients of such gifts.
44. See generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 787 (1985) (“Most American bribery statutes and many of
the judicial decisions interpreting them do not require a quid pro quo . . . .”).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) makes it a felony for anyone to “directly or indirectly give[ ] . . .
anything of value to any public official . . . for or because of any official act performed or to
be performed by such [person].” 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). As with the
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Nevertheless, my discussion will deal exclusively with the bribery section since the applicability of the gratuity section to campaign finances—although upheld by courts46—involves complicated
definitional issues that are superfluous to our point.47
The bribery section makes it a federal crime for any person or
entity to “directly or indirectly, corruptly give[ ], offer[ ] or promise[ ] . . . anything of value to any public official . . . with intent . . . to
influence any official act.”48 An equivalent provision makes it a similar
offense for a public official to “directly or indirectly, corruptly demand[ ], seek[ ], receive[ ], accept[ ], or agree[ ] to receive or accept
anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for . . . being influenced in the performance of any official act.”49
The elements of the crime therefore include:
– a public official;
– giving directly or indirectly;
– receiving or accepting;
– corruptly;
– anything of value;
– with intent to influence or be influenced in the performance
of an official act.
Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) also does not require proof of a “quid pro quo
arrangement,” and there is no reason why it could not be violated by
means of a campaign expenditure.50
bribery provisions, the gratuity provisions also provide for punishments for recipient public
officials who “otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty,
directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally for or because of any official act.” Id. § 201(c)(1)(B). The Supreme Court did read the provision as requiring the Government to “prove a link between
a thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific ‘official act.’” United States
v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 414 (1999). Thus, giving merely with the
intent to build a reservoir of goodwill, as yet unattached to any specific official act, would
not do. But the Court explicitly recognized that no proof of a quid pro quo was necessary—
there is no requirement of giving “in exchange for an official act.” Id. at 404–05. Evidence of
intent to reward past or future favorable acts is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ring, 768 F. Supp. 2d 302, 310 (D.D.C. 2011). Since proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an explicit quid pro quo may be very difficult to obtain, the gratuity provision appears to function often as a fallback crime for typical bribery cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
46. See, e.g., Brewster, 506 F.2d at 77; United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1381 (5th
Cir. 1995).
47. See generally Note, Campaign Contributions and Federal Bribery Law, 92 HARV. L. REV.
451 (1978).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1).
49. Id. § 201(b)(2).
50. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010).
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First, the term “public official” is defined in the statute to include
any “Member of Congress . . . either before or after such official has
qualified.”51 Hence, the bribee may be a candidate running for office,
whether incumbent or not.
Second, as the statutory language makes clear, there is no requirement that the bribe be given directly to the candidate: indirect
giving suffices. Similarly, there is no requirement that the candidate
affirmatively accept anything: the statutory language speaks of accepting or receiving, thereby allowing for the passive reception of a benefit.52 Accordingly, courts allowed prosecutions based on giving to
third parties, so long as the intended bribee derived a benefit from
the giving. In United States v. Williams, for example, a lobbyist for a
poultry producer was charged with violating § 201 based, in part, on
travel expenses and educational assistance given to the girlfriend of
the Secretary of Agriculture.53 Another case involved scholarships
given to a congressman’s son.54 Thus, one could “give” or “receive” a
benefit not offered or accepted directly, and thus could give or receive a campaign expenditure as a bribe.
The requirement that the giving or receiving be done “corruptly”
elicited the following remark from a scholar of bribery law:
Certainly the bribery statutes are intended to proscribe corrupt activity, but it is not easy to discern what, if anything, the concept of
acting “corruptly” adds as an element of the crime of bribery. If the
other elements are present, a public official is offered, seeks, or
accepts an individual benefit that is intended to influence the re51. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1).
52. Id. § 201(b)(2); see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 7 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C. 1998),
vacated in part as moot by United States v. Schaffer, 240 F.3d 35 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United
States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 28
F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1994).
53. Williams, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 43, 52 (“The indictment describes various interests of
Tyson-Foods that were pending before USDA while Secretary Alphonso Michael (‘Mike’)
Espy was Secretary of Agriculture and charges that gifts . . . were given to or for the benefit
of the Secretary [and] his girlfriend . . . . [D]efendants argue . . . [that the] benefits must
have been given to a covered official in order to be unlawful. . . . [However,] this indictment does not charge that defendants provided the Secretary with [gifts, but] . . . that they
provided his girlfriend with travel expenses and educational assistance . . . . [T]he argument fails: . . . the indictment . . . sufficiently charges that the gifts were given ‘to’ the
Secretary, at least as a matter of pleading. It is for the jury to determine whether Secretary
Espy placed any value on the provision of gifts to his girlfriend.” (citation omitted)).
54. See McDade, 827 F. Supp. at 1174–75 (“Mr. McDade points out that the government charges that [a scholarship] was provided to his son, not to him. The government
argues that the evidence will show that Mr. McDade benefitted personally from the scholarship . . . . The government has alleged that Mr. McDade received some sort of personal
benefit from the scholarship. It will be up to the jury to determine whether he actually
did.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-2\SAN203.txt

Fall 2011]

unknown

Seq: 13

15-FEB-12

CONSTITUTIONALIZING CORRUPTION

16:40

371

cipient’s official actions. What more is needed to make the offering, seeking, or accepting “corrupt”? . . . No judicial decision that I
have found contains a definition or explanation of “corruptly” that
adds significantly to the other elements of bribery . . . .55

Indeed, federal courts have read the term “corruptly” not as a substantive requirement but as pertaining to the “degree of criminal knowledge and purpose” with which the giving or receiving must be done.56
The crime of bribery is therefore one of specific rather than general
intent.57
It has been suggested that the “corruptly” requirement should
function as a substantive limitation that denotes “being wrongful or
contrary to the public interest.”58 Such an approach could, in theory,
block the applicability of the statute to campaign expenditures. But
this would be a big shift from the standing interpretation of the statute. And it is difficult to see why campaign expenditures could never
function as a predicate for a bribery conviction, given the obvious intent to penalize the exchange of financial and political favors.
“Anything of value” is a phrase clearly meant to be read broadly,
and courts have done so. “[T]he term ‘thing of value’ is to be broadly
construed to encompass intangible benefits, so long as . . . the donee
placed any value on the intangible gifts.”59 Thus, aiding a person in
obtaining an elected office is certainly something “of value” under the
statute.60
Finally, the “official acts” intended to be influenced “are extremely broad in scope.”61 Section 201(a) defines an “official act” as
“any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may
by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official
capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.”62 Many actions
55. Lowenstein, supra note 44, at 798–99.
56. See United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v.
Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1380 (5th Cir. 1995).
57. See Brewster, 506 F.2d at 72.
58. Lowenstein, supra note 44, at 802.
59. Williams, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 52, vacated in part as moot by Schaffer, 240 F.3d 35; see also
United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 622–23 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Girard, 601
F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1305 (6th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 941 F. Supp. 1262, 1269–70 (D.D.C. 1996),
rev’d, 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
60. See, e.g., Gorman, 807 F.2d at 1305 (noting that a promise of a job is a “thing of
value” under the statute).
61. See United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 325–26 (5th Cir. 1998).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2006).
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undertaken by elected representatives, in legislative capacity and otherwise, qualify under this broad definition.63
Campaign contributions have long formed the basis for prosecutions under the federal bribery statute.64 Given the elements of the
crime, there is no reason why independent campaign expenditures
could not do the same. While the distinction between contributions
and expenditures may be significant for some First Amendment purposes, it plays no role in the language, purpose, or judicial construction of this federal bribery law. Indeed, if given or received with the
intent to influence a specific official act, both contributions and expenditures can equally corrupt good government. In fact, we should
be particularly wary of bribes in the form of campaign expenditures
since campaign finance laws regulate these to a far lesser degree on
the assumption (correctly or wrongly) that they do not implicate serious bribery concerns.
Is the conception of political corruption reflected in the bribery
statute too broad? After all, don’t people make contributions and independent expenditures precisely in order to influence the performance of official acts? And then, how can we reconcile this bribery law
with the recognition of the legitimacy of—indeed the constitutional
protection for—making contributions and expenditures in support of
political candidates?
It is true, of course, that all legitimate contributions and expenditures are made with the intent to influence official acts, but the statute, to be sure, does not penalize all such donations. The statute only
forbids donations accompanied by the intent that they, themselves,
would induce the bribee to take a specific official action. In other
words, what is forbidden is the intent to produce a direct causal chain
between the contribution or the expenditure, through the beneficiary’s awareness of the gift, to the beneficiary’s performance of a specific official act. Most contributions and expenditures are not
accompanied by such nefarious intent. Rather, they are accompanied
by an intent to influence official acts by way of getting one’s preferred

63. See Lowenstein, supra note 44, at 828 (arguing that granting access may be an “official act” under the bribery statute) (“[A] legislator’s time is so limited that the decision to
listen to one person’s arguments and information on an issue and not another’s is itself an
official action.” (footnote omitted)).
64. E.g., United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v.
Head, 641 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982); see
United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369 (5th Cir. 1995).
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candidate elected or, at most, by the intent to win the general good
will of the beneficiary.65
My point here is not to provide a comprehensive defense of the
conception of political corruption reflected in the federal bribery statute—that would take a treatise in political theory. My purpose is limited to the claim that the statute and its scope represent a reasonable
conception of corruption. And so it might be true, as one scholar had
put it (speaking of both the federal and state bribery laws), that
“[u]nder most bribery statutes as they have been interpreted by most
courts, most special interest campaign contributions are bribes.”66 But
this should not necessarily undermine our faith in our bribery laws
rather than our faith in our existing campaign finance practices.
The Citizens United decision, in any event, articulated a very different understanding of political corruption than the one appearing in
the federal bribery statute. “It is well understood,” wrote Justice Kennedy for the majority (quoting his own partial dissent in McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission), “that a substantial and legitimate reason . . . to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate
over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those
political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on
responsiveness.”67 18 U.S.C. § 201 is in direct tension with this facile
grouping of voters and contributors.68 The statute makes it a felony
punishable by fifteen years in prison to give financial support with the
intent that it would influence a specific official act, or to receive such
support with the intent to respond with such official act.69 At least in
theory, our democracy is premised on responsiveness to voters, not to
financial supporters—and a good thing it is too! What vision of democracy endorses the idea that “the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the [financial] supporter favors”?70
That’s called plutocracy, not democracy. After all, there is no “one
person—one vote” principle in the financial realm.
65. See Lowenstein, supra note 44, at 827 (“The most common assertion is that a contributor to a legislator seeks nothing more for the contribution than assured access to a
legislator when important issues arise.”).
66. Id. at 828 (emphasis added).
67. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled
by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876).
68. Id.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
70. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876).
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Naturally, the Court did recognize a point where campaign support and official responsiveness become corrupt. But its distinction
between corrupt and uncorrupt practices is intellectually and practically untenable. The Court believes it is perfectly legitimate—indeed a
laudable aspect of democracy—for people or entities to provide candidates with financial support with the expectation that the candidate
will respond by producing the political outcomes they desire.71 And the
Court also believes that elected officials who “surrender their best
judgment . . . and . . . put expediency before principle” in response to
financial support are not necessarily corrupt.72 Such practices turn
corrupt only in the presence of a “quid pro quo arrangement”73—that
is, an agreement to exchange money for a political act. In the absence
of such “quid pro quo arrangements,” these practices are not instances
of political corruption, and the Court therefore refuses to recognize
any important government interest in preventing them. But why
should it matter for campaign finance purposes whether an official act
is a mere “surrender of judgment” in response to financial support or
the result of an explicit exchange agreement? Insofar as democracy is
concerned, there is no difference to be had here. Either way, money is
allowed to exert power that it should not exert in a healthy democracy. (Or, put differently, if responsiveness to financial support is a
laudable aspect of democracy, why is it a felony to engage in exchange
agreements?) Moreover, the distinction makes little practical sense:
What could the evidentiary difference between a quid pro quo arrangement and a mere “succumb[ing] to . . . influence” or “surrender of
judgment” be? Since only the most crude or stupid need ever resort to
an explicit verbal agreement (given that such verbalization would constitute all a prosecutor would need), such external manifestations are
not likely to exist, or to ever be found even if they did.
Unlike the Court’s conception of political corruption, the federal
bribery statute does not require proof of a “quid pro quo arrangement.”
As a recent decision put it, the statute does not “require simultaneous
proof of § 201(b)(1) [which penalizes the giving] and (b)(2) [which
penalizes the receiving] . . . . [It] does not require proof of a ‘bribery
agreement’ . . . .”74 Intent to influence or be influenced suffices.75
71. Id. at 910.
72. Id. at 911.
73. Id. at 908.
74. United States v. Ring, 768 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308–09 (D.D.C. 2011).
75. This incompatibility may mean that, contrary to some federal circuit court decisions, see, e.g., United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1380–81 (5th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 77 (D.D.C. 1974), the application of the statute to cam-

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-2\SAN203.txt

Fall 2011]

unknown

Seq: 17

CONSTITUTIONALIZING CORRUPTION

15-FEB-12

16:40

375

Bribery can be committed without an actual agreement by those who
give—if they do so with the intent to influence an official act, or by
those who receive—even if they do so merely with the intent to “succumb to influence or surrender their best judgment.”76
In short, the claim that the government has a sufficiently important interest in combating exchanges backed by explicit arrangements, but not in combating exchanges that do not, makes little
theoretical and practical sense and is incompatible with the federal
bribery statute. Moreover, the claim is particularly weak given that the
government’s anti-corruption interest is not limited to combating corruption but extends to combating the appearance of corruption even
where no actual corruption exists.77
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that supporters of the
Citizens United decision wish to put in some reassuring words. In his
keynote address at this symposium, Mr. James Bopp—the lead counsel
on Citizens United until it reached the Supreme Court—berated those
willing to believe that their elected representatives would “sell their
souls” (as he dramatically put it) to financial supporters.78 The argument, apparently, is that political corruption from campaign support
is not a serious concern, and therefore preventive measures restricting
campaign expenditures (or perhaps contributions)79 are unjustified
given the price they exact from First Amendment freedoms.
For my part, I am less sanguine than Mr. Bopp about our elected
representatives; but the argument is silly not solely for its sanctimoniousness but also for its bogus understanding of politics. After all,
politicians are in the legitimate business of selling their principles:
Politicians are supposed to bargain over their beliefs—when striking
paign spending may be declared unconstitutional—either as a matter of First Amendment
jurisprudence or under the vagueness doctrine of the Due Process Clause. In the recent
Skilling v. United States, the Court restricted the reach of another federal bribery statute by
finding some of its applications to be unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process clause. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). The Skilling opinion relied, in
part, on the validity of § 201, stating that there is “no significant risk that the . . . [narrowed] statute, as we interpret it today, will be stretched out of shape . . . [since its] prohibition on bribes and kickbacks draws content . . . from federal statutes proscribing—and
defining—similar crimes.” Id. at 2933. But as we now know, the Court is not as familiar with
18 U.S.C. § 201 as it may think.
76. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910–11.
77. Id. at 901.
78. James Bopp, Jr., Keynote Address at the University of San Francisco Law Review
Symposium (Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/12935740.
79. At least one federal district judge has already extended the Citizens United decision
to the context of corporate contributions. See United States v. Danielczyk, 791 F. Supp. 2d
513 (E.D. Va. 2011).
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legislative compromises, when abandoning positions that turn unpopular, when horse-trading legislative support, or when representing the
interests of their constituencies. To claim that politicians would not
compromise their principles in exchange for increased chances to win
elections is not only to ignore human nature, it is also to ignore the
essence of politics. At any rate, is there anything more un-American
than suggesting we should simply rely on the integrity of our representatives? And isn’t the First Amendment based on precisely the opposite creed?

II.

Judicial Elections

The vision of democracy articulated in Citizens United is unpersuasive and disturbing. But there is even more cause for alarm: The decision, it seems, is equally applicable to judicial election campaigns. In
other words, corporations and unions may have a First Amendment
right to spend money from their general treasuries on electioneering
communications in support of, or in opposition to, candidates running for judicial office.
At first blush, the application of Citizens United to judicial elections seems wholly unwarranted. After all, even if you think that politicians act legitimately when they “respond” to financial supporters,
surely the same cannot be said about judges. Well, not so fast . . . .
To begin with, when given the chance to distance the Citizens
United decision from judicial elections, the majority explicitly refused
to do so.80 The occasion arose when Justice Stevens, concerned with
the implications of the decision, accused the majority of endangering
the integrity of judicial elections and being inconsistent with Caperton
v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.,81 decided a mere seven months earlier.82
In Caperton, the chief executive officer of a corporation whose case was
pending before West Virginia’s highest court spent three million dollars in support of a candidate running for a seat on that court.83 The
candidate won the election, and then refused to recuse himself when
it came time to decide the case.84 He proved the decisive vote in overturning a lower court ruling that had found the company liable for
80.
81.
82.
part).
83.
84.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
Id. at 2257–58.
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fifty million dollars.85 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding it was a due process violation for the judge to sit on a case
involving his principal financial supporter.86
Justice Stevens’ dissent claimed that Citizens United flew in the face
of Caperton since “[i]n Caperton . . . we accepted the premise that, at
least in some circumstances, independent expenditures on candidate
elections will raise an intolerable specter of quid pro quo corruption.”87
Moreover, wrote Stevens, “the consequences of today’s holding will
not be limited to the legislative or executive context . . . . [T]he Court
today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union general treasury spending in [judicial] races.”88
Stevens’ prediction went uncontroverted. Instead of pointing to
the obvious difference between legislative or executive elections and
judicial elections, Justice Kennedy’s opinion simply responded that
Caperton was about judicial recusal requirements, not about campaign
finances regulations.89
There is a reason why the Court’s conservative majority regards
Citizens United as applicable to judicial elections. That reason was articulated in the 2002 case Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.90 White
involved a challenge to a Minnesota regulation that forbade judicial
candidates from announcing their views “on disputed legal or political
issues” during their election campaigns.91 This so-called Announce
Clause therefore prohibited judicial candidates from running for judicial office on political platforms. Candidates were prohibited from
campaigning for a seat on the bench by declaring, for example, that
85. Id. at 2258.
86. Id. at 2265, 2267.
87. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 967 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
88. Id. at 968.
89. Id. at 910 (majority opinion) (quoting Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263–64) (“Caperton
held that a judge was required to recuse himself ‘when a person with a personal stake in a
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on
the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was
pending or imminent.’ The remedy of recusal was based on a litigant’s due process right to
a fair trial before an unbiased judge. Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the
judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned.” (citations
omitted)).
90. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
91. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000), declared unconstitutional by Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. 765. The regulation was borrowed from the
1972 Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)
(1972).
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banning same sex marriage was constitutional, or by staking a position
on the constitutionality of abortion or gun control.
The Supreme Court, in another 5-4 conservative majority decision, ruled that the Clause violated the First Amendment. “If the State
chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic process,” said the Court, “it must accord the participants in that
process . . . the First Amendment rights that attach to their roles.”92
Campaigning judicial candidates could not be prohibited from announcing their controversial legal or political opinions.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by three other justices, objected
that judges should not be allowed to run political campaigns:
Judges . . . are not political actors. They do not sit as representatives of particular persons, communities, or parties; they serve no
faction or constituency . . . . They must strive to do what is legally
right, all the more so when the result is not the one “the home
crowd” wants.93

“Thus,” wrote Ginsburg, “the rationale underlying unconstrained
speech in elections for political office—that representative government depends on the public’s ability to choose agents who will act at
its behest—does not carry over to campaigns for the bench.”94
But the majority in White took issue with this characterization of
the judicial role. “Justice Ginsburg,” said the opinion:
[G]reatly exaggerates the difference between judicial and legislative elections. She asserts that “the rationale underlying unconstrained speech in elections for political office—that representative
government depends on the public’s ability to choose agents who
will act at its behest—does not carry over to campaigns for the
bench.” This complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of “representative Government” might have some truth in
those countries where judges neither make law themselves nor set
aside the laws enacted by the legislature. It is not a true picture of
the American system. Not only do state-court judges possess the
power to “make” common law, but they have the immense power
to shape the States’ constitutions as well . . . . Which is precisely
why the election of state judges became popular.95

Since judges “make law” (“In fact . . . judges . . . often ‘make law’”),
they, like legislators, can be elected on the basis of their disputed po92. Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 788 (alteration in original) (quoting Renne
v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
93. Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing William H. Rehnquist, Dedicatory Address: Act Well Your Part: Therein All Honor Lies, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 227, 229–30 (1980)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 784 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
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litical or ideological beliefs.96 Indeed according to the Court this is
precisely what judicial elections are about: Ensuring the political or
ideological accountability of law-making judges. In other words, “responsiveness” to campaign supporters is as much a feature of judicial
elections as of political elections, and the political philosophy underlying the Citizens United decision may be equally applicable to judicial
election campaigns.
The conservative majority in White included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, who were since replaced by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito; but that change is not likely to make a difference in the Court’s position on the matter.97 Roberts and Alito
have shown what they think about judicial elections when they dissented in Caperton, where they believed it was perfectly constitutional
for a judge to rule on a case involving his biggest financial
supporter.98

Conclusion
Citizens United was another manifestation of the deep rift within
the Court over the role that money could play in representative democracy. For the dissent, a political system that allowed individuals or
entities to gain exceptional influence over elected officials solely by
virtue of spending money on their election campaigns was sufficiently
suspicious to allow Congress to curb the electioneering communications of the wealthiest and most narrowly interested of those influence-seekers—corporations and unions.99 For the majority, by
contrast, gaining influence over elected officials by financially aiding
96. Id. at 784–85 n.12.
97. Justice O’Connor has since expressed public regret over her vote in the case. See
Matthew Hirsch, Swing Voter’s Lament: At Least One Case Still Bugs O’Connor, LAW.COM (Nov.
8, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1162893919695.
98. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
99. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens commented that:
Corporations, as a class, tend to be more attuned to the complexities of the legislative process and more directly affected by tax and appropriations measures that
receive little public scrutiny; they also have vastly more money with which to try to
buy access and votes. Business corporations must engage the political process in
instrumental terms if they are to maximize shareholder value. The unparalleled
resources, professional lobbyists, and singleminded focus they bring to this effort,
I believed, make quid pro quo corruption and its appearance inherently more
likely when they (or their conduits or trade groups) spend unrestricted sums on
elections.
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 965 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
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their election campaigns was nothing short of democracy in action;
and Congress’ attempt to ban corporate and union electioneering
communications went far beyond its power to battle quid pro quo bribery arrangements.100
The debate between these different conceptions of political corruption has far reaching consequences to campaign finance regulations. Indeed, these conceptions pertain not only to campaign
expenditures but also to campaign contributions: the narrower the
Court’s understanding of the anti-corruption interest, the smaller the
government’s ability to regulate all campaign finances. Objecting to
the majority’s narrow conception political corruption, this Article has
argued that that conception is in tension with federal bribery laws and
that it offers no meaningful distinction between political corruption
and legitimate democratic “responsiveness” (as the majority put it).101
Unfortunately, this conception is part of a larger understanding
of the relationship between money and politics that the Roberts Court
has been busy implementing. In 2009, the Court reviewed a challenge
to the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment,”102 a campaign finance
provision that increased the amount of allowed contributions for a
political candidate whose opponent spent more than $350,000 from
his personal funds.103 The Court, with the same five-Justice majority of
Citizens United, invalidated the provision after calling it a “penalty,” a
“potentially significant burden,” and a “drag on First Amendment
rights.”104 The partial dissent objected that far from being a “drag” or
a “burden,” the provision only increased First Amendment activity:
The Millionaire’s Amendment quiets no speech at all. On the contrary, it does no more than assist the opponent of a self-funding
candidate in his attempts to make his voice heard; this amplification in no way mutes the voice of the millionaire, who remains able
to speak as loud and as long as he likes in support of his campaign.
Enhancing the speech of the millionaire’s opponent, far from contravening the First Amendment, actually advances its core principles . . . . And the self-funding candidate’s ability to engage
meaningfully in the political process is in no way undermined by
this provision.105
100.
101.
curring
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 908, 910 (majority opinion).
Id. at 910 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 90, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., conin part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876).
2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-1(a)(1)(A)–(C), invalidated by Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
Davis, 554 U.S. 724.
Id. at 739, 743–44.
Id. at 753–54 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The point was well taken: It is difficult to see how the statute imposed
a burden on the freedom of speech.
But the decision can be better understood if we see it as another
manifestation of the Citizens United vision of democracy. After all, if
campaign contributions and expenditures are constitutionally protected activities almost on par with voting, then the state may have no
business putting its thumb on the financial scales so as to benefit, encumber, or equalize candidates’ campaign finances. Indeed, in
describing the challenge to the statute, the Court stated that:
[Section] 319(a) unconstitutionally burdens [Davis’] exercise of
his First Amendment right to make unlimited expenditures of his
personal funds because making expenditures that create the imbalance has the effect of enabling his opponent to raise more money
and to use that money to finance speech that counteracts and thus
diminishes the effectiveness of Davis’ own speech.106

This conception of democracy was made even clearer in the postCitizens United case Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, which involved Arizona’s system of public financing for political
campaigns.107 The law at issue granted publicly funded candidates additional funds when certain spending thresholds were crossed by privately funded candidates or by outside groups making independent
expenditures on their behalf.108 Arguing before the Court, the attorney challenging the law claimed that the statute “turn[s] my speech
into the vehicle by which my entire political message is undercut.”109
This argument does not describe any burden on candidates’ freedom
of speech but instead complains of government tampering with the
expected impact of campaign finance spending. The Supreme Court
agreed with the argument.110 The problem with the statute, said the
Court, was that it made campaign spending by privately funded candidates “less effective”: “[A]n advertisement . . . that goes without a response is often more effective than an advertisement that is directly
controverted.”111 The Court invalidated the law.112 An astute New York
Times editorial described these arguments as the view that “what mat106. Id. at 736.
107. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
108. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-952 (2006 & Supp. 2010), declared unconstitutional by
Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
109. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Ariz. Free Enter. Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S.
Ct. 2806 (2011) (No. 10-238), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/10-238.pdf.
110. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2828–29.
111. Id. at 2824.
112. Id. at 2828–29.
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ters most for [campaign] money and speech is their ‘fair market’
impact.”113
This vision of democracy, which elevates the slogan “Money
Talks” to the status of a constitutionally protected privilege, also lies at
the foundation of the Citizens United decision. The Roberts Court
seems bent on granting financial supporters a constitutional right to
influence election campaigns in accordance with their financial prowess, free from government efforts to curb or mitigate or equalize their
influence. Corporations and unions, with their big money reservoirs,
get full participation rights, and the whole scheme is likely applicable
to judicial elections as well. What a frightening constitutional vision!
This is nothing less than the constitutionalization of political
corruption.

113. Editorial, Unfettered Money: There Is a High Cost to the Supreme Court’s Belief That
Money Is, Literally, Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2011, at A24 (alteration in original).

